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In the third year of its transition to a functioning market
economy free from high inflation, Russia began its toughest phase
in 1994 under the Chernomyrdin government. The approval by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March of the second tranche of
$1.5 billion signaled support for the economic program of the new
government. The subsequent adoption by the Duma (lower house of the
parliament) of the government's budget and the signing of the civil
accord by several parliamentary factions and industry groups marked
a step, albeit fragile, in the direction of national consensus.
The onset of this ominous phase of reforms continued to divide
policymakers and academics alike in Russia and elsewhere with
respect to the appropriate policy framework for the reforms and the
prospects for their success.
On one side were the "shock therapists," advocating "an abrupt
tightening of monetary conditions, an early pegging of the exchange
rate, and large-scale international aid to support the
stabilization."1 On the other side were the "gradualists" who
proposed firm but gradual ("non-abrupt") and escalating attacks on
the budget deficit and inflation, supported by smaller and more
realistic aid flows and without resort to an outright pegging of
the exchange rate.2 The gradualist program of the Chernomyrdin
government was in place throughout 1994, having been adopted in
effect by former Finance Minister Fyodorov before his departure. It
anticipated an inflation rate of between 7 to 8 percent per month
by the end of the year and a 1994 budget deficit target of 9
2percent of GDP.3
The sustained implementation of this gradulist program was
threatened as inflation surged to 11.8 percent in October after a
steady drop to 4.4 percent in August from 21 percent in January.
Indeed, the sharp decline in the value of the ruble by 21 percent
on October 11, the resignation of the central bank chairman Viktor
Gerashchenko, and the subsequent changes in the central cabinet
threatened the prospects of a continuing stabilization of the
economy.
But first, it is necessary to take a backward glance by posing
three relevant questions: Was shock therapy tried in Russia? Next,
if the answer is in the affirmative, why did it fail? Finally, what
were its consequences? In conclusion, the prospects for the
Chernomyrdin stabilization agenda are discussed in the context of
the "Black Tuesday" crash of the ruble and the cabinet reshuffle
which followed.
Was Shock Therapy Tried in Russia?
The answer to the question according to Boris Fyodorov, the
former Finance Minister of Russia, was a resounding nvet: "Many
people in the West, it seems, prefer to close their eyes to the
fact that there never was any shock therapy, ever, in Russia."
("Moscow Without Mirrors," The New York Times, op-ed, April 1,
1994) . Equally decisive was Sachs's response: "Contrary to recent
commentary, "shock therapy" did not fail in Russia. It was never
tried." ("Betrayal," The New Republic, January 31, 1994, p. 19).
Three issues must be resolved in providing a definitive
3answer: What criterion does one adopt in isolating the shock part
of the reform program which was launched in January 1992? Next,
what was the Gaidar government's intention ex ante with regard to
the shock component of its agenda? Finally, how severe and durable
was this shock ex post as the reform package unfolded with the
January price liberalization?
The Shock Criterion
The critical phrase in the Sachs definition of shock therapy,
namely "an abrupt tightening of monetary conditions" provides a
clue to the search for the shock element in the transition package.
In fact, Sachs himself settles for the relative size (as a ratio of
the GDP) of the government borrowing from the central bank of
Russia (CBR) and the resulting growth of money supply in the
economy as an index of the desirability for administering a shock.4
Thus, the higher the current ratio, the greater the urgency to
curtail it sharply; hence, the more "abrupt" the measures to close
the budget deficit (which is financed by central bank borrowing),
the greater the shock.
The Shock criterion and the Gaidar Program
The government of Acting Prime Minister Gaidar adopted this
criterion hook, line and sinker when it initiated its transition
measures in January 1992.
Thus, the budget deficit for the first quarter of 1992 was to
be reduced to zero from an officially-estimated 1991 level of 17
percent (and IMF-estimated 21 percent) of GDP. Defense outlays,
state-financed investments, and subsidies to consumers and industry
4from the federal budget were slashed. These cuts were Soviet-
style: They did not come from political consultations with the
parliament or the people. (In the view of shock therapists, no such
consensus is necessary for applying the shock, a point which is
argued later.) Local governments were told to find their own
resources if they wished to subsidize people's purchases of basic
foodstuffs and services. (As a result, the regions began
withholding tax revenues from the center for financing local
subsidization of essential, consumer-goods purchases by their
citizens. These details follow later.) The prevailing law of
indexation which linked the earnings of state employees and
pensioners to the cost of living was scrapped. Prices were almost
wholly decontrolled.
Prices jumped by a sharp 3 00 percent in January as a result of
the price decontrol. There was a sudden and sharp decline in the
worth of people's cash savings. The loss of indexation of wages to
price increases for state employees added to their insecurity.
There were also fears about large-scale unemployment from the
proposed stoppage of budgetary support to industry. The social
safety net, in the form of unemployment insurance, was still far
from adequate.
The Shock: How Severe and For How Long?
The severity and duration of the shock can be assessed from
the ex post budget deficit and the resulting rate of growth of
money supply.
Thus, according to Sachs, "temporary stabilization" on the
5basis of a credit squeeze was accomplished in Russia in the first
half of 1992. Indeed, budget figures from January-May 1992 "suggest
that Russia was within reach of stabilization in the first half of
1992. Despite the enormous fall in budgetary revenues as percent of
GNP, there was a comparable fall in government spending as a
percent of GNP. In the first quarter, net Russian Central Bank
(RCB) credit to the General Government was actually negative, at -
2.3 percent of GDP.... The overall money supply grew at an average
of 8 percent per month during February to May, mostly due to
reductions of excess reserves in the banking system rather than net
credit from the RCB. By August, inflation rates had declined to 9
percent per month, which proved to be the low point during 1992 and
1993." (Sachs, 1994, pp. 24-25).
In fact, Sachs marshalls this evidence to argue that the IMF
did not come up with timely and suitable help (to be augmented by
assistance from the G-7) even though the Gaidar government had
achieved "temporary stabilization" by drastically cutting back its
central-bank-borrowing-financed deficit. In other words, the shock
of abrupt credit squeeze (which was applied in anticipation of
foreign resource inflow) had produced the expected macroeconomic
results in Russia during the first half of 1992.
Why did they not last longer?
Why Did Shock Therapy Fail?
The reasons for shock therapy's failure were economic as well
as political.
The Economic Factors
6The temporary macroeconomic stabilization did not endure
because the microeconomic units, the farms and the factories, did
not respond according to market economy norms to the price
signals.5 The Gaidar program naively assumed that, in response to
the new relative price regime, managers would lay off workers in
unprofitable factories; that workers would move to the profitmaking
units; that the managers would choose (like their market economy
counterparts) to make both ends meet and, failing that, would
declare bankruptcies rather than seek, as before, financial support
from the government budget. This did not happen. In fact, the large
number of monopoly producers raised prices (from their administered
levels) and, in the face of reduced demand, accumulated inventories
and retained workers on their payrolls rather than undertake
restructuring. Macroeconomic stabilization failed later in 1992
because the hoped-for, market-economy type reaction of Soviet-era
factory managers to the price signals did not materialize. They
were simply not ready for such a response threatening factory
closures and worker jobs.
The managerial rejection of the program found ready political
acceptance in the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) among the
centrists, and in particular, the communists who regarded the
radical program as an ideological attack on the planned system.
Economically unworkable, it turned out to be politically
unacceptable.
The Political Factors
Shock therapists rule out the need for a political consensus
7which characterizes "hesitant democratization." Rather, the
recommended strategy consists in outwitting the old guard by
identifying a political breakthrough6 and launching swift and tough
reforms rightaway. Evidently, these windows of opportunity opened
up in Poland in 1989 after its liberation from the Soviet empire
and in Russia in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Thus, Anders Aslund writes: "...the paramount task of the new,
noncommunist leadership was to build a democratic state as simply
and quickly as possible. Speed was of the essence both in breaking
the power of the old communist apparat and in erecting defenses
against the counterattacks that it might mount after licking its
wounds for a time."7
Speed, toughness and appropriate timing mark the Sachs agenda
as well. In his view, (Sachs, 1994, p. 19 and pp. 32-33), a handful
of Russian reformers in the finance ministry and the central bank
could launch the big bang because the president was popular and the
populace was acquiescent at the start of 1992, an assumption which
the subsequent opposition showed to be a mistake. In particular,
the macroeconomic stabilization could not be sustained after mid-
1992 because escalating political opposition ruled out monetary
control and fiscal discipline.
The program also floundered because of its politically
untenable assumption of massive foreign assistance which it failed
to procure.
The Role of Foreign Aid
8The speed with which inflation could be controlled by slashing
government outlays was conditioned not only by the economic and
political realities of Russia but also by the external support
which could be mobilized for the purpose.
It was necessary to divert budgetary support away from defunct
factories and use it for unemployment compensation, worker
retraining, and safety net provisions for the population, and for
promoting investment to restructure these factories. But the size
of the outside funding for the purpose and the Russian capability
to absorb it speedily and efficiently hobbled the process.
The record of external support for Russia since the start of
the transition in January 1992 was marked by loud rhetoric,
generous promises, and small deliveries.
Only $8 billion of the promised $28.4 billion was disbursed in
1993.
The IMF and the World Bank gave $1.8 billion for short-term
macroeconomic stabilization out of the promised $4.1 billion. The
delivery of the massive $10.1 billion ($4.1 billion stand-by
credits from the IMF for full economic stabilization and another $6
billion for supporting the ruble) was being negotiated toward the
end of 1994.
Only $6.2 billion of the $14.2 billion promised by the Gl
(group of industrialized market economies) for supporting factory
restructuring, infrastructure buildup and overhaul of agriculture
and the energy sector was distributed by the end of 1993.
A major concession in 1993 (which would be continued in the
9future) was the rescheduling by the G7 of the official principal
and interest payments by Russia.
The disparity between aid promises and deliveries to Russia
was not surprising. A common thread underlying IMF and World Bank
lending is conditionality—"you may continue to borrow only if you
perform." In general, aid dollars should not be wasted. Indeed they
should be used productively in a free market environment so that
the recipient benefits from the aid through steady growth instead
of getting overloaded with a debt burden that cannot be serviced or
repaid. The ultimate objective of aid activity is to promote
private investment.
These conditionalities were hard to fulfil at the Russian end
and therefore, moderation in implementing them was necessary. A
major problem (noted earlier) was encountered in closing large
factories.
In short, massive aid inflows to cushion the burden of
unemployment and decline in living standards resulting from deficit
reduction in Russia had to be ruled out. Such megabucks underlying
the shock therapy agenda were not available; nor could the Russian
economy absorb them with the necessary speed.
The mounting political turmoil which followed the launching of
shock therapy operated at three levels.
Consequences of the Shock Therapy
The fastpaced program led to increasing polarization in 1992
between the executive and legislative branches at the center and
between Moscow and the eighty-eight territorial units. Both
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polarizations continued in 1993. 1993 also witnessed the exit and
entry of cabinet ministers with President Yeltsin orchestrating an
apparent centrist balance between the reformers and the
conservatives in the government.
The Polarization between the Executive and Legislative Branches
The legislators elected in 1990 to the old Russian parliament
were a mixed bag of reforming democrats, ardent communists, and a
fringe of diehard nationalists and extreme (Soviet) unionists who
were ready to go beyond the war of words for resurrecting old
times. The membership was one-third reformist, one-third antireform
extremists (including the communists), and the remaining fluid
marsh (boloto) which moved in either direction.
The January shock brought out in the open a variety of voices.
But increasingly, proreform centrists who were against the speed
of the program joined ranks with the old faithfuls who regarded it
as an onslaught on the former system of administered prices,
bureaucratic management of factories, and their automatic bail-out
by budgetary subsidies. Economic measures, in their view, were
unleashed to accomplish political goals of destroying the communist
planned system. By August 1992, the Supreme Soviet had forced the
government to rescue bankrupt factories. By September 1993, it was
ready to push the (1993) budget deficit to 25 percent of GDP. The
escalation culminated with the dissolution of the parliament, the
attack on the White House, and the December elections.
The composition of the post-election parliament signaled the
adoption of a gradualist transition (implying firm rather than
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abrupt inflation control) during 1994. The adoption and fulfilment
of the monthly inflation target of 1 to 1.5 percent in the 1995
budget also called for a careful balancing of the claims in the
budgetary pie of the parliamentary factions which must approve the
budget.
The Polarization between the Center and the Periphery
Over time, this friction was brought out in the open by the
hasty fiscal measures of early 1992 which were calculated to roll
back the federal budget deficit in a grand swoop. A number of
expenditure items were summarily taken out of the central budget
and passed on to lower levels without a proper agreement on the
principles of financial rearrangements between the center and the
regions.
The regions in the Soviet days were responsible for education,
health care, culture, housing, local roadbuilding and the like.
They also got the necessary finances from the center. In 1992,
more federal programs such as capital investments in rural areas,
subsidies for livestock products, development of local passanger
transport were shifted to the regions without matching finances.
The ad hocism continued into 1993: The 1993 budget initially
proposed that the regions could keep between 5 to 50 per cent of
the value-added taxes with the minimum to be kept by the highest
tax contributors. The center would then redistribute the tax
revenue as it saw fit.
The resulting pattern of taking and transfering cash turned
out to be neither equitable nor logical. Thus, in the truly poor
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regions of Tuva, Buryatiya, Dagestan, Mari El and Kabardino-
Balkariya, the 1992 per capita budget expenditure (including
contributions from the center) was about half the average level for
Russia as a whole. Again, Ulyanovsk Province was contributing 50
per cent of value-added tax to the center in contrast to the 80 per
cent "tribute" of nearby Yaroslavl.
There were other forces such as ethnic identity which were
pulling the regions away from Moscow but the perceived fiscal
armtwisting by the center of the resource-rich members was
increasingly pushing the "primeval Russian lands" into demands for
economic autonomy. The center reacted by capitulating to the more
vociferous claimants and weakened the tenuous fiscal arrangements
further. By the fall of 1993, almost thirty of the eighty-eight
members had unilaterally cut back their tax contributions to
Moscow. The charge was led by Bashkortostan, the Chechen Republic,
Tatarstan and Yakutiya which gave nothing to the federal budget in
1992.
The lesson for the Chernomyrdin government from the rash
fiscal ad hocism of the radical reformers was to avoid its
repetition. The assignment of expenditures and matching revenues
called for firm but fair negotiations with the regions on the basis
of mutually acceptable principles of the devolution.
The Polarization within the Central Cabinet
Throughout 1993, President Yeltsin had to contend with two
opposing pressures: He had to have a radical finance minister to
control inflation so that the IMF would release its promised aid;
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he had to have a conservative component in the cabinet (arguing for
production boost via industrial subsidies) to pacify the parliament
which had a similar view. By September 1993, he faced defeat on
both counts. Parliament voted to triple the budget deficit (from
the original 8 trillion rubles) and the IMF refused to release the
second tranche of the promised $3 billion funding. At the same
time, the divisions within the cabinet were openly ventilated by
radical ministers on the national TV and the western media bringing
the level of public discourse to its lowest level. It created a
legitimate worry among western policymakers and international
business that there was no government in Russia.
By contrast, the post-election cabinet consisting of like-
minded colleagues was cohesive. Whereas the "technocrats" of
radical reform failed at managing the politics of implementing its
agenda, the new government of "managers" held out the promise of a
credible policy scenario of measured inflation control. By
contrast, its reconstituted "snake and hedgehog" mix toward the end
of 1994 (following the sharp decline in the ruble's value on
October 11) created uncertainties in regard to further progress on
inflation control.
The Economic Balance Sheet
The radical agenda of January 1992 ushered in a revolution of
ideas at the two levels of market-determined prices and of private
ownership of means of production. The planned economy principles of
administered prices and of state ownership of productive assets
were jettisoned forever.
14
Progress on both fronts in practice however was far from
complete.
Thus, despite price decontrol, prices of food items and
consumer goods continued to show a dispersal (which could not be
accounted for transport costs) in the vast territory of Russia.
Again, prices of raw materials and machinery goods failed to
approach world levels: Energy prices moved up from 7 to 9 percent
of world levels in 1991 to 30 to 40 percent by mid-1994; on the
other hand, domestic prices of raw cotton and wool, zinc and
copper, and timber declined relative to world prices. These prices
were not fully liberalized nor was the trade regime completely
freed. Segmented markets and transport bottlenecks also persisted.
The record of privatization too was mixed.
The State Committee for the Management of State Property
reported that 103,796 units from the federal to the republican,
regional and municipal levels had been privatized under its mandate
by July 1, 1994. Russian citizens had placed 144.5 million vouchers
(out of 148 million) in enterprises and investment funds of their
choice.
The achievements were momentous in the sphere of "petty"
privatization: Over 67,000 enterprises in retail and wholesale
trade, public catering and restaurants, and consumer services were
sold, or leased with prospects for future purchase.
By contrast, large and medium factories were only
corporatized, i.e. formally converted into joint stock companies.
About 30,000 such units had started this process of conversion
15
beginning with approval of plans and ending with actual
registration (of 21,000 units). A quarter of the 2,000 defense
factories were excluded altogether from the privatization mandate.
While a few small and medium-sized companies had increased
production efficiency, shed labor and diversified product mix, the
big enterprises had responded tardily to market forces, accumulated
payment arrears, and continued operating. The daunting task of
restructuring the viable and liquidating the bankrupt enterprises
lay ahead.
The Federal Bankruptacy Agency of the State Property Committee
had started functioning by September 1993 and bankruptacy agencies
were in place in 82 regions of Russia by September 1994. Contracts
were being signed with private auditors for screening enterprise
balance sheets. By early August, 100 factories were put on the
insolvency list and the number was increasing daily by several
dozen. The bankruptacy resolution of the government of May 20, 1994
laid down the procedures: It granted a moratorium on enterprise
debts for 18 months during which the enterprise was required to pay
off arrears by selling property and finding new investors. State
subsidization was ruled out. Given the unprecedented scale of
insolvency—in some regions 40 to 70 percent of the factories were
bankrupt—, restructuring was bound to proceed slowly.
Farm privatization too faced an uphill task. Private farms,
277,000 in all, averaging 43 hectares each, represented barely 5 to
6 percent of the arable land by July 1, 1994.
Finally, the income distribution consequences of the
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transition raised concern. These issues related to the increasing
unemployment, properly measured, of the workforce, the widening
income gap between the rich and the poor, and the escalating
nonpayment of wages and salaries to the workers on the factory
payroll.
By July 1994, 4.6 million people were jobless and were looking
for work; another 4.5 million were forced to work part time or
take vacations with or without pay. The total of 9.1 million
unemployed and semi-employed implied that one out of every eight
able-bodied persons was without a steady job.
Next, the income gap between the haves and the have-nots was
widening although the July 1994 disposable incomes, adjusted for
inflation, rose by 11 percent over July 1993. 26 percent of the
earned income went to the top 10 percent of the population and 2.4
percent went to the bottom 10 percent in the first seven months of
1994. This ratio of 11 to 1 had jumped from 8 to 1 in 1992. 24.5
million Russians or every sixth citizen had income below the
minimum living standard in July defined at 96,500 rubles per month
for an adult.
The nonpayment of wages had risen from 2.3 trillion on April
1 to 3.8 trillion on August 1. More than 2 0 million people in
34,000 enterprises were denied payments due to them.
The income distribution could worsen if the government were to
fail in guaranteeing financial support to the most vulnerable
citizens and in providing unemployment compensation and job
retraining to the unemployed workers. Some jobless could be
17
absorbed in the expanding tertiary sector but the Soviet practice
of allocating factory housing to employees restricted labor
mobility.
The resources available to the government for the purpose
toward the end of 1994 were meagre. Its financial health and indeed
the pace of macroeconomic stabilization continued to engage Russian
policymakers and the IMF teams which began negotiations in October
on the $4.1 billion standby credits to Russia.
The Financial Fragility of the Government
The 1994 budget which was approved by the Duma (after three
readings on May 11, June 8, and June 24) provided for expenditures
of 286 trillion rubles (194 trillion rubles at the federal level),
revenues of 230 trillion rubles (the federal share was 124 trillion
rubles), and extrabudgetary contributions (from the state pension
and insurance funds) of 8 trillion rubles. The deficit of 48
trillion rubles (estimated at 6.5 percent of the projected GDP of
746 trillion rubles) was to be financed largely by government
borrowing (of 40 trillion rubles) from the central bank.
The budget projections were unrealistic even as they were




The center's ability to raise tax revenues was projected
unrealistically. The continuing decline in industrial output
shrank the tax base. (It was expected to fall sharply by 25 percent
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in 1994 compared to 16 percent in 1992 and 1993, and 11 percent in
1991.) Again, consumer subsidies were abolished at the center but
they persisted in the regions. As a result, the net revenues
transfered to the federal government became more unpredictable as
the subsidy claimants in some localities increased. Finally, in the
Soviet days, taxes were automatically passed on by enterprises and
localities to the central treasury. With mounting decentralization
and regional autonomy, the voluntary transfer required transparent
and stable tax rules, commitment to fiscal contracts, and fear of
revenue authorities. None of this was fully in place in Russia.
Tax evasion increased.
As a result, 1994 federal revenues were unlikely to exceed 70
trillion rubles (in contrast to the targeted 124 trillion rubles)
requiring an expenditure trimming of 54 trillion rubles if all
other pieces of the original exercise including the projected
deficit of 48 trillion rubles were to remain unchanged.
1994 Budget Expenditures
With regard to expenditures. the 1994 budget appropriations
gave substantial allocations to agriculture and energy. The urgency
to guarantee adequate food supplies to the population by supporting
agriculture and to stabilize the oil industry as an export earner
was in evidence here. Explicit defense allocations amounted to 19
percent of the total. The budget provided resources (usually
transfered in early autumn) to the administrations of the Northern
Territories enabling them to store food, energy and materials for
the needs of 11 million residents in the winter months. On the
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other hand, there was no provision for support to industry except
for coalmining. Resources were to be handed to the claimants as
cheap credits rather than outright grants.
The ability of the government to cap appropriations at agreed
levels was tested to the hilt in the summer.
By midyear, loans in the amount of 1.4 trillion rubles were
granted from the budget to various factories among them the Rostov
Farm Machinery Plant, the Kama Automobile Plant, the Altai Diesel
Plant and several others. On a trip to the Tuva region in mid-June,
President Yeltsin promised generous support to the local leadership
to build a sheepskin coat factory and develop its water transport
system. He forbade all government and presidential officials from
demanding that the republic earn its own money and live without
federal subsidies flzvestiva, June 18, p. 2) . More presidential
decrees providing support to industries which were not covered by
budgetary appropriations followed. Thus, the decree of early August
sanctioned an appropriation of 3.5 trillion rubles for defense
industry conversion: 2.9 trillion rubles were to be issued at an
interest rate of 37 percent which was one-fourth of the Russian
central bank's discount rate.
As a result of the manifold largesse, central bank monthly
credits to the government reached 7 trillion rubles in July in
contrast to the average 3 trillion earlier raising serious doubts
about the government's ability to control inflation at the August
rate of 4.4 percent.
A direct outcome of the widening gap between disbursements and
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revenues was the indiscriminate use of budgetary sequestration:
Expenditures were cut back or postponed and wage payments on
government account were delayed. A serious consequence of
slackening inflation control and rising inflationary expectations
was the October 11 crash in the ruble's value which was magnified
by the central bank's mismanagement.
Budgetary Sequestration
The only course of action open to the government to get out of
the financial logjam was budgetary sequestration: Collection of
existing taxes could not be improved overnight nor could new taxes
be levied without parliamentary approval; at the same time, the
targeted deficit (enacted by the lawmakers) had to be met whereas
the expenditure ceilings could be left unfulfilled.
By July, the agro-industrial complex had received less than 10
percent of the appropriated funds from the budget. No money had
been allocated for investment in the economy. Millions of state
employees failed to receive wages on time. By the end of June, the
federal government had settled 1993 wage arrears of 4 trillion
rubles but new obligations arising in particular from the 90
percent salary increases to state employees beginning January 1,
1994 had accumulated. The state and its workers lived from hand to
mouth. And the army lived in poverty according to Defense Minister
Pavel Grachev who declared in the Duma on November 18 that military
funding ran at about half the appropriations.
The "Black Tuesday" Ruble Crash
An ostensible purpose in letting the ruble slide beginning
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September 22 when the Russian central bank stopped supporting it on
the Moscow InterBank Foreign Exchange was to augment federal
revenues. The "benign" neglect of the currency however turned out
to be a nightmare on October 11.
A depreciating ruble would bring in higher ruble earnings from
exports of items under the Centralized Export Scheme (which became
effective in January 1993) under which the government bought a
variety of strategic items such as oil, gas, nonferrous metals,
fertilizers and timber from domestic producers and sold them abroad
at world prices. The difference between the domestic and world
prices became budgetary revenues. (Licensed exporters of these
items who were required to hand in all foreign exchange to the
Finance Ministry received 5 to 7 percent of the export earnings for
their services.) Such net earnings from the Centralized Export
Schemes of 2.5 trillion rubles were 58 percent of the total export
taxes of 4.3 trillion rubles in 1993.
This apparent scheme to boost revenues in the central treasury
misfired as traders on the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange
manipulated the currency by unloading rubles in a thin market in
which the daily transactions averaged 100 to 150 million dollars.
The ruble bounced back to its previous value with delayed central
bank intervention of $100 million. The acting central bank chairman
Tatyana Paramonova would need to remain watchful and quickfooted in
the foreign exchange market in order to avoid a recurrence of such
destabilizing episodes.
The deteriorating inflationary expectations certainly played
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a role in the speculative flight from the ruble. The ruble's slump
brought home the critical need for inflation control as the
reconstituted government and the IMF awaited the passage of the
1995 government budget by the Duma. The budget proposed a monthly
inflation rate of 1 to 1.5 percent by mid-1995 and a budget deficit
of 8 percent of the projected GDP. Its plan was to bring government
borrowing from the central bank to zero and to keep federal outlays
on agriculture and defense at 1994 levels. The deficit was to be
covered by borrowing from the public and financed partially from an
expected credit of $13 billion from the IMF.
Thus, as 1994 was closing, financial stabilization involving
domestic resolve and foreign participation was once again at the
top of the Russian reform agenda. A credible program of inflation
control would strengthen the ruble, induce domestic savings,
attract foreign investment and stabilize production.
Prospects
On the eve of the Duma's debates on the budget, President
Yeltsin had reorganized the cabinet of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
with his unfailing touch for pitting reformers against hardliners.
Vladimir Panskov, a bureaucratic budget advisor on Yeltsin's staff,
was brought in as Finance minister along with the mildly reform-
oriented Yevgenii Yasin as the Economics Minister. Anatoly Chubais
with impeccable reformist credentials was elevated as First Deputy
Prime Minister and put in overall charge of the economy. Despite
the cabinet reshuffle, Chernomyrdin managed to present the tough
budget to the parliament signaling a unified cabinet position on
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inflation control.
The parliamentarians on the other hand, watchful of their
reelection chances in 1995, could be expected to argue in favor of
lowering the monthly inflation target and test the government's
determination to hold the line. As before, there would be demands
to raise budgetary support for defense and agriculture. The
government's inability (evidenced in 1994) to collect adequate
revenues, the need for escalating budgetary resources to provide
support to the unemployed, the uncertain prospects (arising from
the fragile infrastructure) of channeling public savings into
federal bonds would be brought out in the Duma discussions. The
government's expectation of budgetary support from IMF would be
questioned as unrealistically high.
But toward the end of 1994, the new wrinkles in these old
debates on stabilizing the economy appeared from two directions.
Not only was the need to strengthen the ruble more widely
acknowledged but the procedures for accomplishing the goal had
entered the phase of vigorous bargaining and the inevitable give-
and-take between the government and the parliament. This
interaction by its very nature ruled out a breakthrough on
financial stabilization (marked by say a "big bang" single-digit
annual inflation) but held out the promise of a monthly inflation
regime by the end of 1995 of less than 3 percent.
Finally, the economy showed signs of qualitative changes.
Industrial production began to pick up in the late summer of 1994;
sizeable rubles were increasingly drawn into investment rather than
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financial speculation. Domestic savings in Russia had increased
from 5 trillion rubles in January 1994 to 15 trillion rubles in
July. The sale of government stock and the issue of new shares for
cash in the corporatized factories began to provide resources,
domestic and foreign, for their restructuring. Parliamentary
legislation in early 1995 marking a stable tax system and
guaranteeing ownership by foreigners was expected to start the
long-awaited flow of foreign investment in Russian industry.
Will the political give-and-take and the economic turnaround
prove sufficiently resilient in 1995 to stabilize the ruble and
hold at bay the negative aspects of the process, namely the
gathering unemployment and the widening income distribution?
Perhaps the emergence of a stable market economy has proved to be
more macabre in Russia than the early beginnings of free markets
elsewhere in the western world. Despite the ominous setting, 1995
could prove to be the year of Russia's start of that historic
j ourney.
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1. This description is from the chief exponent of shock therapy,
Jeffrey Sachs ("Russia's Struggle with Stabilization: Conceptual
Issues and Evidence," Annual World Bank Conference on Development
Economics, April 28-29, 1994, p. 1). Also see his book on Poland's
experience and its promise for Russia (Poland's Jump to the Market
Economy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992).
2. See Padma Desai, "Confused Thinking about Russian xGradualism',"
The Financial Times, Lettters to the Editor, April 19, 1994.
Note that price liberalization and privatization are a
necessary feature of this version of gradualism. Its hallmark is
firm but manageable control of inflation supported by feasible
flows of foreign assistance. (See Padma Desai, "Ease Up on Russia,"
The New York Times, op-ed. December 10, 1993). It must, therefore,
be distinguished from the market-socialism-type gradualism in which
enterprises were freed from obligatory state quotas (and,
therefore, matching input supplies) but prices remained
administered, consumer subsidies on essential purchases were
retained, wages outpaced prices because monetary discipline was
missing, the state continued supporting enterprises and running
budget deficits for the purpose, and state ownership of assets
persisted.
3. These figures are from Viktor Chernomyrdin, "No Exits on the
Road to Market," The Financial Times. May 16, 1994.
Note that Anders Aslund incorrectly characterized the
Chernomyrdin agenda as shock therapy. See his "Gradualism Has
Proved Ineffective in Russia," The Financial Times. Letters to the
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Editor, April 12, 1994, and the author's response "Confused
Thinking about Russian xGradualism'," op. cit.
4. Note that, in the absence of subscription by the public and
financial institutions to government bonds, the mounting Soviet and
Russian budget deficits were covered by government borrowing from
the central bank.
This official definition includes actual rather than
appropriated outlays and excludes the massive subsidies (to
domestic users) on imports on government account in 1992 which were
financed by (foreign) supplier credits. The IMF by contrast uses
the definition of "enlarged deficit" which allows for these
subsidies (in budgetary outlays) and includes contributions to
revenues from extrabudgetary sources such as government pension and
insurance funds. Thus, its estimate of the Russian budget deficit
for the first quarter of 1992 was 25.3 percent of GDP.
5. For a discussion of the problems facing Russian factories, see
the author's "Give Russia a Tough Accountant," The New York Times,
Letters to the Editor, July 7, 1993, and "Ease Up on Russia," The
New York Times, op-ed. December 10, 1993.
6. Thus Leszek Balcerowicz identifies two stages of "extraordinary"
and "normal" politics which follow a "great political breakthrough
in a country's history." During the "extraordinary politics" phase
which is "close to a great change in a country's history," the
readiness to accept radical economic measures is high. "It is based
on the assumption that liberation from foreign domination and
domestic political liberalization produce a special state of mass
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psychology and corresponding political opportunities: the new
political structures are fluid and the older political elite is
discredited. Both leaders and ordinary citizens feel a stronger-
than-normal tendency to think and act in terms of the common
good....Extraordinary politics, however, quickly gives way to the
more mundane politics of contending parties and interest groups...
. " Details are in Leszek Balcerowicz,"Understanding Postcommunist
Transitions," Journal of Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 4, October 1994,
pp. 75-89.
7. Anders Aslund, "The Case for Radical Reform," Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 4, October 1994, p. 64.
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